Information Security and Privacy: 16th Australasian by Claude Carlet (auth.), Udaya Parampalli, Philip Hawkes

By Claude Carlet (auth.), Udaya Parampalli, Philip Hawkes (eds.)

This e-book constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the sixteenth Australasian convention on info safeguard and privateness, ACISP 2011, held in Melbourne, Australia, in July 2011.
The 24 revised complete papers awarded including an invited speak and nine poster papers have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from 103 submissions. The papers are equipped in topical sections on symmetric key cryptography, hash features, cryptographic protocols, entry regulate and protection, and public key cryptography.

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Additional info for Information Security and Privacy: 16th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2011, Melbourne, Australia, July 11-13, 2011. Proceedings

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In this phase, our attack is benefit from the subkey relation and the precomputation. Note that once we know 61 ∼ 64 of k 1 and bits 1 ∼ 4, 13 ∼ 60 of k 2 (which are also included in the 15-th round), we can access the corresponding (L0 ⊕ k 1 , R0 ⊕ k 2 ) from Γ1 . The procedure is demonstrated as follows. 1. , 8, guess kl15 (KB : 61 ∼ 68, 73 ∼ 124) and remove the pairs that do not satisfy ΔSl15 = (P −1 (ΔL15 ))l . About 2228−7×8 = 2172 pairs will be kept. From Table 1, bits 61 ∼ 64 of k 1 and bits 1 ∼ 4, 13 ∼ 60 of k 2 are known.

If there is a pair satisfy this, then discard the key guess. Otherwise for every 219-bit key guess, exhaustively search the rest 37 bits of KR to calculate KA , use the relation of KA and KL to recover KL , and test the resulting (KL , KR ) by trial encryption. Complexity. 5 known plaintexts. In the data collecting phase, the computation of the 7-th and 8-th bytes of P −1 (ΔR15 ) is less Table 1. Corresponding Bit Positions of the Subkeys in KB and KR Subkey Bit positions Subkey Bit positions Subkey Bit positions Subkey Bit positions in KB bytes in KB bytes in KR bytes in KR bytes k11 1∼8 k52 97 ∼ 104 k13 16 ∼ 23 k114 125 ∼ 4 9 ∼ 16 k62 105 ∼ 112 k23 24 ∼ 31 k214 5 ∼ 12 k21 1 2 3 17 ∼ 24 k7 113 ∼ 120 k3 32 ∼ 39 k314 13 ∼ 20 k3 25 ∼ 32 k82 121 ∼ 128 k43 40 ∼ 47 k414 21 ∼ 28 k41 33 ∼ 40 k115 61 ∼ 68 k53 48 ∼ 55 k514 29 ∼ 36 k51 41 ∼ 48 k215 69 ∼ 76 k63 56 ∼ 63 k614 37 ∼ 44 k61 49 ∼ 56 k315 77 ∼ 84 k73 64 ∼ 71 k714 45 ∼ 52 k71 57 ∼ 64 k415 85 ∼ 92 k83 72 ∼ 79 k814 53 ∼ 60 k81 65 ∼ 72 k515 93 ∼ 100 k24 88 ∼ 95 k213 69 ∼ 76 k12 73 ∼ 80 k615 101 ∼ 108 k22 k32 81 ∼ 88 k715 109 ∼ 116 2 k4 89 ∼ 96 k815 117 ∼ 124 30 J.

6 of the key guess remained. 6 trail encryptions are required to recover the whole key. The complexity of this step is thus 2 × 2219 × [1 + (1 − 2−8 ) + . . 6 . 1 15-round encryptions. Table 2. 1 KP: known plaintext; CP: chosen plaintext; CC: chosen ciphertext; DC: differential attack Cipher Camellia-128 New Impossible Differential Attacks of Reduced-Round Camellia-192/256 6 31 Conclusion In this paper, we present several 6-round impossible differentials with F L/F L−1 layers in the middle, which lead to impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256.

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